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Introduction
This article examines the link between monetary policy 
and fi  nancial stability in the context of the recent fi  nancial 
and economic crisis. It aims to draw lessons from those 
recent events and to examine the implications for mon-
etary policy. More specifi  cally, it asks whether, apart from 
its price stability mandate, monetary policy should play a 
more signifi  cant and pro-active role in safeguarding fi  nan-
cial stability. The underlying motive behind that discus-
sion, focused on the respective aims of price stability and 
fi  nancial stability, is of course to investigate how monetary 
policy could best contribute towards the performance of 
the macroeconomy in the broad sense.
This question has recently formed the focus of numerous 
publications and speeches by well-known researchers 
and/or policy-makers  (1). This reveals that it is clearly too 
soon to draw defi  nite lessons, and that there is as yet 
no post-crisis consensus on monetary policy, whereas 
before the crisis a consensus had emerged among central 
banks and academics in recent decades. The link between 
monetary policy and fi  nancial stability is currently the top 
priority of both theoretical research and more practical 
research conducted by central banks and the academic 
world, and that is likely to remain so in the coming years. 
It is therefore obvious that only provisional lessons can be 
drawn at the moment.
The layout of this article is as follows. The fi  rst section 
discusses the so-called pre-crisis consensus on monetary 
policy. The second section looks at the lessons which can 
be drawn from the crisis and examines to what extent 
they have cast doubt on the pre-crisis consensus. The fi  nal 
section sets out the conclusions.
1.  The pre-crisis consensus on 
monetary policy
This section starts by considering the main economic 
developments of recent decades, since they form the 
background against which the pre-crisis consensus on 
monetary policy has emerged. It then reviews the main 
elements of that pre-crisis consensus and examines in 
more detail the specifi   c link between monetary policy 
and fi  nancial stability. Finally, it comments briefl  y on the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy in that context.
1.1  From “Great Infl  ation” to “Great Moderation”
In recent decades, the monetary policy debate has focused 
mainly on the link between infl  ation and economic activ-
ity, while the issue of fi  nancial stability or instability has 
taken a back seat. The reason probably is that, in the 
period following the Second World War, the advanced 
economies did not really encounter any serious fi  nancial 
crises  ; as demonstrated by the work of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), that is in stark contrast to the scale of the 
pre-war fi  nancial turbulence and the extent of the recent 
global fi   nancial crisis. Conversely, infl   ation and growth 
were more volatile, especially when – in the 1970s, fol-
lowing the oil shocks and monetary policy decisions which 
later proved inappropriate – infl  ation accelerated sharply 8
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both in the United States and in most of the countries 
which would later make up the euro area. By the early 
1980s, a policy of disinflation had been introduced. 
Experience had indicated that tolerating inflation had not 
promoted more sustained economic growth or falling 
unemployment, but instead had derailed inflation expec-
tations and caused monetary instability, which in turn had 
had negative repercussions on growth and employment.
Moreover, that disinflation was accompanied by a marked 
decline in macroeconomic volatility. Since the mid 1980s, 
both inflation and economic growth have been less vola-
tile than previously. That is why economists often talk of 
the “Great Moderation” (after the “Great Inflation” of 
the 1970s), a period of great macroeconomic stability 
which was suddenly interrupted by the recent financial 
crisis and the particularly severe recession which followed 
during 2008-2009.
There are several factors which could account for this 
“Great Moderation”. First, it could be simply attributable 
to the fact that, during that period, the economy hap-
pened to experience essentially favourable macro economic 
shocks. It could also be due to structural changes in the 
economy, such as more flexible product and labour mar-
kets or better management techniques, e.g. in regard 
to stock management. Finally, a more efficient macro-
economic policy – and in particular a more efficient 
monetary policy – may also have helped to stabilise the 
macroeconomic environment. Opinions are divided on 
the relative importance of these explanations, but it was 
widely believed that a more efficient monetary policy had 
made a significant contribution. Over the years, in the 
macroeconomic context described above, a clear consen-
sus on (good) monetary policy did in fact emerge. That 
consensus was based on the following elements.
1.2  Elements of the pre-crisis consensus
First, monetary policy-makers came to the understanding 
that the long-term pattern of inflation was determined by 9
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the prevailing monetary policy system. However, acknowl-
edging that inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon 
does not imply that real shocks cannot affect it. Shocks on 
both the demand and supply side of the economy have 
an impact on inflation, but the impact can be moderated 
if the central bank pursues a policy designed to stabilise 
inflation. However, if the central bank does not combat 
the inflationary pressure resulting from such shocks, but 
instead accommodates it, the impact will be considerably 
greater because of soaring inflation expectations. Thus, 
in all the advanced economies the first oil shock of the 
1970s triggered a clear surge in inflation, although it was 
less marked in Germany precisely because monetary policy 
– even during that period – was aimed more at maintain-
ing price stability. Today it is commonly assumed that 
monetary policy steers the long-term pattern of inflation, 
so that it should preferably aim at price stability.
A second element of this consensus on monetary policy is 
the idea that price stability does not have a cost in terms 
of economic activity, at least in the long term. It is in fact 
real – and not nominal – factors that determine economic 
growth and employment in the longer term. That is why 
the attempts of the monetary policy-makers in the late 
1960s and in the 1970s to stimulate growth by paying the 
price of higher inflation were unsuccessful. What is more, 
such a period of monetary instability and high, volatile 
inflation has adverse consequences in terms of growth 
and employment owing to the rise in risk premiums, the 
distorted price signals and the resulting arbitrary distribu-
tion of incomes. The advantage of aiming at low and 
stable inflation lies precisely in the prevention of those 
distortions. Thus, the understanding became widespread 
that the best way for monetary policy to contribute to 
sustainable economic growth was by guaranteeing price 
stability. Nevertheless, this emphasis on price stability 
does not mean that central banks are totally imper- 
vious to other economic considerations. Most central 
banks pursue some form of “flexible inflation targeting” 
(  terminology taken from Svensson, 1999). Apart from the 
emphasis on the main aim of price stability, in the short 
term they take account of other considerations, such as 
developments in economic activity. The aim is to avoid the 
excessive volatility in economic activity and nominal inter-
est rates which could accompany “strict inflation target-
ing”. While the dual aims of price stability and sustainable 
economic growth in the long term are not contradictory, 
and are even complementary, monetary policy may in fact 
face dilemmas in the short term, e.g. in the case of supply 
shocks, and a gradual response is often advisable.
A third element of the pre-crisis consensus on monetary 
policy is the major role played by inflation expectations in 
the inflation process. Economic agents are forward look-
ing when setting prices and wages, thus taking account 
today of expectations regarding inflation in the future. 
The central bank’s credibility in regard to the mainte-
nance of price stability is therefore crucial. For instance, 
the excess inflation of the 1970s led to higher inflation 
expectations, whereas the disinflation seen in the 1980s 
initially brought only a very gradual decline in those 
expectations. At first, there was little faith in the central 
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bank’s promise to reduce inflation, so that inflation expec-
tations exceeded observed inflation for quite some time. 
That complicated the task of monetary policy in regard 
to price stability  : a more restrictive policy was needed, 
and that had a short-term cost in terms of economic 
activity. In sharp contrast, during the past decade infla-
tion expectations have remained firmly anchored because 
the monetary authorities have pursued a credible policy 
aimed at price stability. As a result, inflation expectations 
in the United States hardly increased at all in the wake of 
the rising inflation experienced in 2005-2007. In the euro 
area, for which long time series on inflation expectations 
are not available, inflation expectations also remained 
firmly anchored during 2007-2008, whereas the increas-
ing commodity prices triggered a sharp surge in inflation. 
In both the United States and the euro area, the marked 
fall in inflation during the crisis also had only a limited 
impact on inflation expectations.
It is precisely because credibility and inflation expecta-
tions are so crucial that much importance is nowadays 
accorded to the institutional aspects of monetary policy. 
A fourth element of the pre-crisis consensus therefore 
concerns the creation of a framework forcing the mon-
etary policy authority to concentrate on the aim of price 
stability. That fosters credibility, leads to better anchoring 
of inflation expectations, and ultimately facilitates the sta-
bilisation of inflation. The establishment of such a binding 
framework is the practical reflection of the lessons drawn 
from the “discretion” versus “commitment” debate in 
the literature  (1). There are several important factors here. 
The existence of an explicit mandate – maintaining price 
stability – is one. In addition, many central banks have 
translated that mandate into a quantitative inflation 
target, offering a nominal anchor for inflation expecta-
tions and encouraging accountability. The adoption of a 
clear strategy with regular central bank communication 
on the subject means that the policy also becomes more 
predictable and therefore more effective, since it thus 
becomes easier to steer expectations. However, that trans-
parency and predictability do not mean that monetary 
policy is implemented mechanically according to some 
rule  : although the decisions conform to a clearly stated 
strategy, the policy-maker still has some discretion and 
can therefore be flexible in implementing the strategy. 
In reality, the economy is far more complicated than the 
highly simplified economic models demonstrating the 
superiority of the “commitment” approach, so that the 
policy-maker needs to have a degree of flexibility. Practical 
experience has also shown that the central bank should 
preferably be independent in the exercise of its mandate. 
That also enhances credibility, though the central bank 
must still be accountable for its actions and motivations. 
That is the only justification for a high degree of inde-
pendence. Moreover, the obligation to render account 
permits clarification of the strategy pursued.
1.3  Monetary policy and financial stability in the 
pre-crisis consensus
Before the outbreak of the crisis, a fairly broad consensus 
had also emerged in regard to the link between mon-
etary policy and financial stability. Thus, it was generally 
accepted that by guaranteeing price stability, monetary 
policy was making a considerable contribution towards the 
maintenance of financial stability, for example by reducing 
the risks associated with financial contracts, which are 
generally concluded in nominal terms. Preventing defla-
tion also promotes the maintenance of financial stability, 
since it avoids a significant increase in the real burden 
of existing debts. The greater predictability of monetary 
policy may equally help to maintain financial stability 
since it makes it easier to estimate the likely impact of 
certain financial decisions, such as the conclusion of a 
variable rate mortgage loan. Conversely, financial stability 
was regarded as a key – if rarely binding – constraint for 
monetary policy, since financial instability can seriously 
disrupt the monetary transmission mechanism. Since that 
transmission mechanism had hardly ever been disrupted 
by a serious financial crisis in recent decades, that aspect 
had become a minor consideration in current thinking.
Despite the recognition of that long-term complemen-
tarity between the aims of price stability and financial 
stability, it was obvious from the start that while the 
pursuit of price stability was an essential aim, it could not 
be sufficient in itself to ensure financial stability. However, 
the dominant view did not attribute a more active role 
to monetary policy, but considered that financial stability 
must be achieved primarily by an appropriate prudential 
policy in terms of regulation and supervision. Yet it must 
be said that the consensus on that aspect was not as 
broad as the consensus on the role of monetary policy 
mentioned above, in regard to inflation and growth 
respectively. That debate centred largely on whether or 
not monetary policy should take account of asset prices, 
and if so, how and to what degree.
In that connection, the dominant view was that mon-
etary policy-makers should take account of asset prices 
and other financial variables only in so far as they have 
implications for the future trend in activity and inflation 
over a period normally taken as relevant for monetary 
(1) At first, the focus was on the inflation bias (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) : 
“discretion” leads to higher inflation, but does not improve economic activity. 
Later, there was more emphasis on the stabilisation bias : “commitment” leads 
to a better trade-off in the short term between inflation stabilisation and 
stabilisation of the output gap (cf. for example Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)).11
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policy (usually little more than two years). It was only 
considered appropriate to respond if rising asset prices 
were accompanied by wealth effects which propelled 
growth and thus generated inflationary pressure. Asset 
prices and financial variables were therefore not aims in 
themselves, but merely ordinary variables in the broad 
range of indicators forming the basis of the central bank’s 
growth and inflation forecasts. A more explicit response 
to a rise in asset prices beyond what was necessary to sta-
bilise inflation – for example, to prevent the development 
of a bubble – was generally regarded as inappropriate. 
However, there were also divergent opinions on the sub-
ject. Various observers – such as Cecchetti et al. (2000), 
numerous publications by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), White (2006), etc. – have shown that a 
central bank should really take account of asset prices and 
financial imbalances beyond their implications for infla-
tion forecasts over a two-year horizon. They constantly 
warned against the serious macroeconomic consequences 
of the bursting of a bubble, including the impact on price 
stability, since deflationary pressure may develop in such 
circumstances. They therefore advocated looking beyond 
the usual horizon and curbing any strong surge in asset 
prices, a policy known as “leaning against the wind”. 
However, the dominant view was still that asset prices 
should not become a supplementary aim of monetary 
policy. In simple terms, that view was based on five main 
arguments  (1).
First, it is difficult to identify bubbles in real time. In 
principle, there appears to be no reason to assume that 
monetary policy-makers are in a better position to dis-
tinguish between rising asset prices caused by improved 
fundamentals and the formation of a bubble. While cen-
tral banks have an accurate idea of the optimum level of 
inflation, that is not the case for asset prices.
Second, in the past, the bursting of a bubble has not 
always led to serious financial instability and major macro-
economic fluctuations. Part of the reason may lie in the 
aforesaid fact that financial instability was rarely a seri-
ous issue after the Second World War, at least not until 
recently, or that any bubbles which did occur appeared on 
less crucial markets. Moreover, there was the impression 
that a very accommodating monetary policy could largely 
limit the impact of a burst bubble on the real economy.
The third argument was that, once a bubble had burst, it 
was always possible to make drastic cuts in interest rates 
in order to limit the macroeconomic damage caused by 
the crash. This strategy of “cleaning instead of leaning” 
was therefore often applied in the recent past, and at first 
sight was reasonably successful, e.g. after the 1987 stock 
market crash and the bursting of the dotcom bubble, and 
that strengthened the feeling that it was not really impor-
tant for monetary policy to prevent bubbles.
The fourth argument was that the interest rate instrument 
is not very suitable for preventing financial imbalances. 
It was originally assumed that large interest rate adjust-
ments are needed to prevent bubbles. Ordinary sized 
interest rate hikes are probably not very significant in 
comparison with the capital gains which investors expect 
in the bubble development phase. Moreover, interest 
rates are not an accurately targeted instrument, whereas 
the emergence of bubbles on particular markets might 
require a more specific approach. Finally, it is preferable 
to intervene at an early stage in the bubble, although 
that is precisely when it is most difficult to identify the 
bubble. Later, when the bubble is easier to detect, it is 
more difficult to tighten monetary policy because that 
could actually accelerate the bursting of the bubble and 
even intensify its adverse impact on the real economy. 
This implies that, according to the dominant view, “lean-
ing against the wind” may have a high price in terms of 
macroeconomic volatility, at least across the usual horizon 
relevant for monetary policy, and is also difficult to imple-
ment in practice.
Finally, attention was systematically drawn to the fact that 
additional policy dilemmas would be created. For example, 
that is so if the central bank faces a favourable and persist-
ent supply shock which causes inflation to fall, whereas 
that same shock may engender excessive optimism about 
the future on the financial markets, and could lead to a 
bubble. In that case, it is necessary to tighten policy in 
order to prevent the bubble, but in such circumstances 
inflation control actually requires an easing of policy. 
Moreover, such policy dilemmas hamper communication 
and may make the eventual decision less transparent. 
Furthermore, the independence of monetary policy may 
also be at risk because other policy areas such as regulation 
and supervision have a significant influence on financial 
stability. The maintenance of price stability thus becomes 
more complicated because the advantages outlined above 
of a simple but clear framework are lost, with possible 
adverse effects on the anchoring of inflation expectations.
1.4  The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem 
in the light of the pre-crisis consensus
The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem is largely 
in line with the pre-crisis consensus outlined above. For 
instance, price stability is indubitably the primary objec-
tive of monetary policy. That is even expressly spelt out 12
(1) In regard to inflation during the period 1914-1921 in the United States, it must 
be said that it was probably influenced significantly by the First World War. 
in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 
Furthermore, the Treaty also stipulates the independence 
of the central bank, and it states that monetary policy 
should support general economic policy in the Union, 
without prejudice to the goal of price stability. The aims 
of that policy include sustainable, non-inflationary growth 
and high employment. In regard to financial stability, the 
Treaty stipulates that monetary policy should contribute to 
the effective implementation by the competent authori-
ties of the policy on prudential supervision of credit insti-
tutions and the stability of the financial system. Not only 
does that again indicate the priority of the price stability 
objective, but it also explicitly acknowledges that other 
institutions (supervisory and budgetary authorities) have a 
key responsibility in regard to financial stability.
The ECB Governing Council then defined a clear strategy 
for putting the price stability mandate into practice. That 
strategy first gives a quantitative definition of price sta-
bility, defining it as an increase in the HICP of less than 
but close to 2 p.c. in the medium term in the euro area. 
Both the aim of low inflation and the quantification of 
that aim are entirely in line with the pre-crisis consensus. 
The stipulation that stability is to be maintained in the 
medium term is also important, because it allows a degree 
of latitude in the short term to take account of other 
considerations – such as the prevention of excess volatil-
ity in interest rates or economic activity – and therefore 
permits a gradual policy response. The monetary policy 
strategy of the Eurosystem is also based on an analytical 
framework comprising two pillars : economic analysis and 
monetary analysis respectively, each being intended to 
detect risks to price stability at different horizons. This 
unique two-pillar strategy means that the Eurosystem 
pays explicit attention to financial developments, more 
so than other central banks. However, it should be noted 
that the monetary analysis was initially aimed at identify-
ing risks to price stability rather than financial imbalances, 
since it originated from the long-term link between the 
trend in the money supply and inflation. Nonetheless, 
monetary analysis has gradually focused more on aspects 
of financial stability. Thus, on the basis of its monetary 
analysis, the ECB Governing Council repeatedly expressed 
its concern, during the years preceding the recent finan-
cial crisis, over the movement in property prices in certain 
euro area countries.
Like other modern central banks, the Eurosystem is 
open about its strategy and the way in which it is imple-
mented : monetary policy decisions are explained in detail 
in the light of that strategy, setting out the justification 
for the policy pursued. As a result, monetary policy has 
become ever more predictable. In the first twelve years 
of monetary union, this has effectively stabilised inflation 
at a level corresponding to the quantitative definition of 
price stability and ensured that inflation expectations are 
firmly anchored. The stabilisation of inflation was also 
accompanied by a high level of macroeconomic stability in 
the euro area, at least prior to the eruption of the recent 
financial crisis.
2.  Lessons from the crisis
This section draws a number of provisional lessons from 
the crisis and examines the extent to which they cast 
doubt on the pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy. 
Of course, it is still too soon to draw definite lessons. 
Not only is the crisis not entirely over – in recent months 
it actually entered a new phase – but it will take time to 
analyse these experiences in depth. Yet some lessons are 
already fairly clear.
2.1  Price stability is not sufficient to maintain 
financial stability and macroeconomic stability 
in general
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that efforts to 
achieve price stability were necessary but certainly not 
sufficient in themselves to ensure financial stability. 
Although the pre-crisis consensus did not claim that the 
pursuit of low and stable inflation would always ensure 
financial stability, the importance of a policy specifically 
aimed at financial stability had faded somewhat into the 
background. In that regard, the experience of the recent 
crisis differs little from earlier periods of financial instabil-
ity. During the run-up to a financial crisis, high inflation 
seldom appeared to be a problem  ; quite the contrary. 
That is evident from four periods in which substantial 
financial imbalances built up  : the 1930s in the United 
States, the years 1980-1990 in Sweden, 1980-1990 in 
Japan and the current crisis for which data for the euro 
area are shown here. On each occasion it is evident that, 
during the bubble formation phase, inflation was rela-
tively low, on average  (1). It is also notable that after the 
bubble had burst, inflation generally fell sharply, in some 
cases actually becoming negative. In other words, while 
price stability is not sufficient to prevent the formation 
of bubbles, the bursting of a bubble clearly generates 
deflationary pressure, and hence downside risks to price 
stability.
Moreover, in contrast to some of the assumptions in 
the pre-crisis consensus, the recent financial crisis clearly 13
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shows that under certain circumstances the bursting of 
a bubble can certainly create considerable financial and 
macroeconomic instability. That is also evident from his-
torical research conducted by the IMF (2009)  : economic 
recessions accompanied by a financial crisis are on aver-
age more protracted and deeper than others.
The current crisis also shows that a fragile financial 
system can seriously disrupt the transmission of mon-
etary policy. Moreover, managing the macroeconomic   
consequences of the bursting of a bubble can put 
a heavy strain on the monetary authorities  : the two 
aspects go hand in hand because, in principle, any seri-
ous disruption of the transmission mechanism implies 
a need for stronger monetary policy impulses. During 
the post-war period, it was often possible to offset the 
macro  economic consequences of financial crises by 
drastic easing of the monetary policy interest rate, but 
the latest crisis has shown that, in certain circumstances, 
the traditional interest rate instrument may be rapidly 
exhausted and that central banks had to make extensive 
use of unconventional monetary policy measures in order 
to generate additional monetary impulses once short-
term interest rates had reached their lower limit, on the 
one hand, and also to correct specific malfunctioning in 
the monetary transmission, on the other hand. Owing to 
its severity, this crisis also caused a substantial deteriora-
tion in public finances, a recurrent feature of serious 
financial crises, as is evident from historical research by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). To sum up, in the immediate 
future there is little room for manoeuvre if the economic 
crisis were to take a turn for the worse. In regard to fiscal 
policy, the time has come to consolidate public finances, 
Chart 3  price Stability and financial Stability  (1)
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Outlook for inflation over five years, 
according to the ECB’s quarterly survey 
of professional forecasters
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Sources : Thomson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg and ECB.
(1)  Interest rate deflated by inflation expected in one year’s time on the basis of the ECB’s quarterly survey of professional forecasters.
as is clear from recent developments on the market in 
government securities.
The idea that aiming at price stability would be sufficient 
to ensure macroeconomic stability proved to be an illu-
sion. More specifically, it is evidently inadvisable to adopt 
a  laissez-faire policy in regard to cumulative financial 
imbalances, and it is obvious that policy-makers should do 
more than simply limit the macroeconomic impact during 
a downturn. That is perhaps the most important lesson to 
be learnt from the crisis, but it does not necessarily mean 
that monetary policy itself should tackle the formation 
of financial imbalances, let alone take sole responsibility 
for that. It is in fact necessary to assess to what degree 
monetary and prudential policy respectively should be 
deployed for that purpose (cf. below).
2.2  Inflation expectations firmly anchored, even 
during the crisis
However, the above remarks do not imply that monetary 
policy geared to price stability made it more difficult 
to combat the macroeconomic consequences of the 
crisis. On the contrary, the firm anchoring of inflation 
expectations enabled the monetary policy-makers to 
respond appropriately. When the financial crisis spread 
to the real economy, and inflation fell sharply and even 
became negative as a result of the decline in commodity 
prices, that steep fall in inflation had very little impact 
on inflation expectations. The reduction in the nominal 
key interest rates thus led to a marked fall in the ex 
ante real interest rate, which actually became negative. 
Since it is precisely the latter rate that is important for 
economic activity, a very expansionary monetary policy 
was therefore feasible. That would have been impossible 
if inflation expectations had been insufficiently anchored 
and had mirrored the decline in inflation. Such a down-
ward uncoupling of inflation expectations is specifically 
one of the principal mechanisms triggering a deflationary 
spiral. Deflation would in turn have seriously hampered 
the ongoing process of debt deleveraging, and would 
therefore have placed additional stress on financial and 
macroeconomic stability.
For the future, it is therefore crucial to take full account of 
the need for effective anchoring of inflation expectations – 
one of the key elements of the pre-crisis consensus.
2.3  Recurrent patterns can help to identify financial 
vulnerabilities
The difficulty of identifying financial imbalances in real 
time has already been mentioned. That difficulty was one 
of the main arguments against the use of asset prices as 15
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(2) Cf. in particular Borio and Lowe (2002), Detken and Smets (2004), Bruggeman 
(2007), Adelid and Detken (2007), Borio and Drehmann (2009), Gerdesmeier et 
al. (2009) .
an additional monetary policy objective. Of course, that is 
equally true in the case of prudential policy. Nonetheless, 
recent research has revealed patterns which recur system-
atically in the run-up to a serious financial crisis. Moreover, 
the current crisis largely confirms those patterns.
It is not so much the actual rise in asset prices that causes 
a problem, but the combination with rapidly rising debt 
leverage. Historical analysis has also shown that the most 
damaging bubbles have been those concerning house 
prices  (1). The two aspects are closely linked. Although a 
sharp fall in both share prices and house prices leads to a 
substantial wealth loss, the impact on the financial system 
varies. Rising share prices are not generally accompanied 
by an increase in the debt leverage of households or insti-
tutional investors, so that the bursting of such a bubble 
does not directly threaten the financial system, and the 
macroeconomic implications are therefore confined to 
negative wealth effects for private consumption and a 
negative impact on investment resulting from the rise in 
corporate financing costs. In contrast, rising house prices 
are generally accompanied by a sharp increase in the debt 
leverage of both households and financial intermediaries. 
If those prices fall, that puts severe pressure on the bal-
ance sheets of the economic sectors concerned, triggering 
additional transmission mechanisms  : there are mutual 
feedback effects both between the real economy and 
the financial economy, and between financial institutions 
and financial market segments. In that context, it is not 
surprising that recent research  (2) has also revealed the 
existence of recurrent patterns – mainly in credit, mon-
etary aggregates and asset prices – which help to identify 
the development of financial imbalances. It is also clear 
that the accumulation of current account deficits leads to 
increased vulnerability in many cases. Further research on 
this subject is obviously desirable. It could offer angles for 
more detailed monetary analysis under the Eurosystem’s 
two-pillar strategy. Over the years, that analysis has pro-
gressed from a virtually one-sided approach – suggesting 
a direct, positive link between monetary developments 
and the longer-term risks to price stability – towards a 
more eclectic approach which also establishes a link with 
both the economic cycle and the risks to financial stability.
Despite the progress on the analysis front, it would not be 
true to say that the identification of financial imbalances 
in real time is no longer a challenge, as many of the findings 
on that subject are based on ex post analysis. They also 
present an average pattern for the various crises, so that 
those findings cannot be regarded as reliable predictors 
of individual crises. There is therefore still a relatively 
high risk of failing to spot an impending crisis, and thus   
adopting a policy which is too passive, alongside the risk 
of a false alarm and hence an overly pro-active policy. Both 
situations generate costs in the form of excessive macroeconomic 
variability, but the current crisis – owing to its unusual severity 
– has shown that the costs resulting from the first type of 
policy errors may be greater than the costs of the second 
type of errors. Moreover, this type of real time uncertainty 
over the accuracy of the policy pursued does not only 
occur in this context but is inherent in the actual conduct 
of the policy. For example, it is equally difficult to obtain 
an accurate assessment of the inflationary or deflationary 
pressure present in the economy, owing to the uncertainty 
surrounding the measurement of the output gap in real 
time. But in that case, such uncertainty does not prompt 
the policy-maker to adopt a passive approach. It only 
encourages caution in the use of both the uncertain indi-
cator and the available policy instruments.
2.4  Implications for monetary policy and (macro) 
prudential policy
It is clear from the foregoing that, in view of the scale 
of the current financial and economic crisis, on the one 
hand, plus the fact that understanding of the patterns 
associated with the formation of financial imbalances has 
gradually improved, economic policy can and should pay 
more attention to the management of financial vulner-
abilities. This article has so far left unanswered the ques-
tion whether that is a task for monetary policy, prudential 
policy, or both. Of course, there is also the question of 
possible interactions between these two aspects of policy.
In that regard, it is worth looking further into the causes 
of the current financial and economic crisis. It is evident 
that both macro- and microeconomic factors have played 
a role. At macroeconomic level, the “Great Moderation” 
mentioned earlier reached its zenith on the eve of the 
crisis and created what with hindsight proved to be an 
exaggerated sense of security. Moreover, following the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble, monetary policy had 
been eased significantly, primarily in the United States. 
Fears of deflation – fuelled partly by cheap imports from 
the emerging economies – prompted the monetary 
authority to keep interest rates exceptionally low for a 
lengthy period. Finally, the capital flows associated with 
the global imbalances caused distortions in the prices 
of many assets, and subsequently helped the contagion 
to spread to various countries and economic regions, so 
that the crisis became global. More particularly, the risk-
free long-term interest rate was further depressed by the 
massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by 16
(1) Cf., for example, Bini Smaghi (2009), Borio and Zhu (2008).
(2) For empirical results, see in particular Gambacorta (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009) 
and Altunbas et al. (2009).
Asian central banks. Those reserves were invested mainly 
in American government paper. The low real interest 
rate encouraged the expansion of credit, and in many 
economies led to unsustainable property price rises. It also 
prompted a search for yield which led to riskier behaviour.
At microeconomic level, things first went wrong because 
consumers, investors, financial institutions and even 
rating agencies received and/or gave false signals, so that 
ultimately risk-taking steadily increased. That risk was in 
turn measured or estimated incorrectly, since the most 
recent period, though relatively long, was a time of unu-
sually great stability. That in turn led to less stringent risk 
management. Finally, regulation and supervision proved 
to be too weak, because too much reliance was placed on 
the self-regulating effect of market discipline.
In the end, analysis of the causes of the crisis indicates 
that it was a complex interplay of various factors, rather 
than one particular factor, that was decisive. In that con-
text, it is rather unrealistic to assume that either monetary 
policy or prudential policy could avert the formation of 
financial imbalances in the future. Moreover, if monetary 
policy had to carry all the responsibility, it could face seri-
ous dilemmas in certain circumstances, and would there-
fore have to strike a balance between the aims of price 
stability and financial stability. That would pose a threat 
to the hard-won credibility of inflation control, whereas 
that is of vital importance, as demonstrated by the crisis.
It is therefore beyond dispute that prudential policy needs 
to be strengthened and that macro-prudential policy has 
a key role to play, alongside the more traditional micro-
prudential policy. While micro-prudential policy on regu-
lation and supervision focuses on individual institutions, 
macro-prudential policy aims to limit systemic risk. The 
horizontal and vertical dimensions are both important 
here. The horizontal dimension refers to the fact that the 
entire financial system may get into difficulties as a result 
of the interconnections between individual institutions. 
The vertical dimension concerns procyclicality, i.e. the 
phenomenon of self-amplifying feedback mechanisms 
between the financial system on the one hand and the 
broader macroeconomy on the other. Procyclicality may 
contribute to the development of unsustainable upward 
movements, but in a downturn it may equally inflict seri-
ous damage on the financial system, causing a severe 
recession. The main instruments considered here are 
those which are used for the regulation and supervision 
of individual institutions – capital buffers, liquidity buffers, 
maximum loan-to-value ratios, etc. – but their use is 
adjusted to a broader perspective.
By augmenting the financial system’s resilience and 
containing procyclicality via the use of additional instru-
ments, a successful macro-prudential policy together with 
an appropriate micro-prudential policy can facilitate the 
conduct of monetary policy. Limiting the procyclicality 
of the financial system makes it easier, in principle, for 
monetary policy to achieve macroeconomic stability and 
more particularly, to aim at price stability, but of course 
it is no substitute for that policy. Macro-prudential and 
monetary policy are therefore likely to be synchronised 
and mutually reinforcing in a phase in which policy is 
tightened or eased. Furthermore, specific macro-pruden-
tial instruments reduce the risk of serious policy dilemmas 
precisely because the two aspects of policy can move in 
opposite directions, depending on the circumstances, and 
therefore address specific challenges in an appropriate 
way. That could happen, for example, in situations where 
the financial system is vulnerable, but at macroeconomic 
level there are nevertheless upside risks to price stability. 
At that point, macro-prudential policy could be eased 
while monetary policy is tightened, therefore securing the 
necessary room for manoeuvre since there is less need to 
be concerned about the health of the financial system. 
Conversely, in certain circumstances, it may be desirable 
to ease monetary policy while tightening macro-pruden-
tial policy, e.g. in situations where there is no inflationary 
pressure whereas unsustainable developments are threat-
ening the financial system. As stated earlier, that type of 
situation is not infrequent.
Viewed in that way, the question is whether it is suffi-
cient to reinforce prudential policy and whether it is still 
necessary for monetary policy to aim to contribute more 
to financial stability. Nonetheless, it is rather unlikely that 
prudential policy will be sufficient on its own to safeguard 
financial stability in all circumstances. That is why it seems 
right that monetary policy itself should make a bigger 
contribution here than in the past. For one thing, the 
design of macro-prudential policy is still in its infancy, so 
that it is preferable, at least in the first instance, to adopt 
realistic aims and objectives. Also, monetary policy itself 
undeniably has an influence on the risk-taking behaviour 
of the various economic agents. It is therefore appropri-
ate to take full account of that influence on risk-taking, 
which is also regarded as an additional monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, known as the risk-taking chan-
nel  (1). It operates in various ways  (2). Thus, a lower (risk 
free) interest rate exerts a positive effect on the valuation 
of assets and collateral, so that financial institutions are 
able to enlarge their balance sheet, and that is accom-
panied by greater risk-taking. Higher valuations are often 17
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also accompanied by lower volatility, so that the usual 
yardsticks indicate a lower risk. Moreover, in a period of 
low nominal interest rates, a search for yield may develop 
because of a degree of inertia in the nominal returns 
which investors aim to achieve. That is attributable to 
a form of monetary illusion  ; certain nominal yields may 
also have been guaranteed, whether or not on a contrac-
tual basis, by pension funds or life insurers for example. 
Finally, monetary policy may have encouraged greater 
risks by tending in the past to react asymmetrically to the 
movement in asset prices – a widely accepted rule of the 
pre-crisis consensus – and the financial markets may have 
seen that as an insurance against risk-taking.
The fact that monetary policy is to contribute more 
towards safeguarding financial stability need not be at 
odds with the aim of price stability. The crisis specifically 
showed that too narrow a focus on price stability at a 
horizon of no more than two years may imply risks for 
financial stability and thus also for price stability in the 
longer term. By helping to safeguard financial stability, 
monetary policy therefore promotes the attainment of 
its own goal, and in effect assumes an extension of the 
monetary policy horizon. In the case of the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy, the medium-term stance offers the 
necessary scope for that. Moreover, a key role can be 
assigned to monetary analysis, though it should be noted 
that, in that case, its content would change. Traditionally, 
strong growth of the money supply and credit has been 
linked to upside risks to price stability, while the preven-
tion of the formation of financial imbalances aims to limit 
the downside risks to price stability which accompany 
the bursting of a bubble. Although a strong monetary 
dynamic justifies the tightening of monetary policy in both 
cases, the reasons for the tightening are different.
2.5  An integrated analysis framework, but clearly 
defined mandates for monetary and macro-
prudential policy
The strong interactions between the real economy and 
the financial economy on the one hand, and between 
a macro-prudential policy that reduces procyclicality 
and monetary policy on the other, require an integrated 
analysis framework in which those interactions are clearly 
defined. That makes it possible to assess the impact of the 
macro-prudential policy on the behaviour of the financial 
system, and to examine which are the most appropriate 
instruments. Moreover, that also means that the influence 
of the macro-prudential policy on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms can be analysed and taken into 
account in the conduct of monetary policy.
Development of such an integrated analysis framework 
is therefore a top priority for the research agenda in the 
immediate future. Central banks have a clear comparative 
advantage here, since they can combine their knowledge 
of the financial markets and the financial system with the 
macroeconomic analysis which they conduct in order to 
support monetary policy. This natural “macroeconomic 
reflex” makes central banks particularly suitable candi-
dates for a key role in macro-prudential policy. That also 
facilitates the rapid exchange of expertise and information 
between monetary and macro-prudential policy, enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of both policy aspects.
Nevertheless, monetary and macro-prudential policy 
require clearly defined mandates and corresponding strat-
egies, because that makes them more accountable and 
should permit full consolidation of monetary policy’s hard-
won credibility in regard to the price stability objective.
Conclusion
The current financial and economic crisis has again high-
lighted the importance of financial stability and has clearly 
demonstrated that macroeconomic stability requires more 
than just price stability. The question is therefore whether, 
in the future, monetary policy should make a greater 
contribution to the maintenance of financial stability, and 
perhaps be given a broader mandate. That debate is still 
ongoing, but some key points are already becoming clear.
Thus, everyone agrees that financial stability benefits in 
the first place from a strengthening of prudential policy, 
and particularly from the conduct of a macro-prudential 
policy alongside the more traditional micro-prudential 
policy. While the latter focuses on individual institutions, 
macro-prudential policy aims to limit the systemic risk 
associated with two types of interaction, namely the 
interactions between financial institutions themselves, 
and those between the financial system and the macro-
economy. A successful macro-prudential policy makes it 
easier to conduct monetary policy  ; it prevents monetary 
policy from being over-burdened or confronted by serious 
policy dilemmas, so that it can continue to focus on the 
primary goal of price stability. Indeed, the importance of 
firmly anchored inflation expectations and the credibility 
of the price stability mandate was also clear during the 
crisis.
Although this does not, in principle, imply any modifica-
tion of the existing monetary policy frameworks, it nev-
ertheless seems advisable for monetary policy itself to do 
more to safeguard financial stability. Above all, it is neces-
sary to take account of the impact of that policy on the 18
risk-taking behaviour of the various economic agents. In 
addition, greater importance should be attributed to anal-
ysis of the formation of financial imbalances. That is not 
at odds with the priority of the price stability mandate, 
because the crisis clearly showed that risks to financial 
stability in the longer term also imply risks to price stabil-
ity. However, it does assume an extension of the monetary 
policy horizon. If that horizon is actually extended, that 
should preferably be made explicit, as it would clarify the 
monetary policy strategy and increase accountability.19
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